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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the realignment of forces that derailed the Cancun meeting to broaden and 
deepen the WTO’s world trade agenda held in September 2003, which according to conventional 
wisdom was supposed to be a done deal. The growing disjuncture between global cultural flows 
of people and ideas, and the rules and practices of globalization has created a highly unstable 
environment with many opportunities but at the same time significant political costs. Regardless 
of what EU and US may admit in public, at Cancun global dissent and its publics acquired 
visible agenda-setting power. The growth in influence of the ‘nixers’ and ‘fixers’ has contributed 
to a tectonic shift in the international economy that has immediate and far-reaching 
consequences for destabilizing globalization and its narrow economic agenda.   
 
The second argument is that global cultural flows of ideas, texts and wealth have deepened the 
global environment of dissent at the WTO. Many of these flows are the consequence of free 
trade itself. They have accelerated as economic barriers have fallen facilitating the movement of 
ideas, people and texts driven by new technologies and the appetite for mass culture. Increased 
trade has increased cultural interaction globally. These concentrated movements of peoples and 
ideas beget other flows triggering a cyclical movement of dissent and are highly disjunctive for 
the goals of economic globalization. When these global cultural flows function as catalysts for 
change, they become both a conduit and channel for the global movement of social forces. They 
set new agendas and, it is this agenda-setting capacity that challenges state authority globally no 
less locally. So far there is no single over-riding vision that addresses the collective problem of 
diversity at the global level. Nonetheless, the global dissent movement intends to have a 
prominent role in defining public culture and in shaping it in inherently democratic ways. 
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The Turning Point 
 
No one can afford to be indifferent to the profound absence of forward momentum in the world 
trading system. Both regional and global trade negotiations, by quite separate paths and  for 
distinct reasons, have arrived at an impasse. Turning point is an apt phrase suggesting the 
presence of an array of forces pushing and pulling the present world trading system towards a 
new configuration with different rules, practices, ideas, and mentalities (Prestowitz, 2002; 
Barber, 2003). To look at the political economy of dissent through this lens helps identity the 
processes and behaviours that have produced the present global impasse.  
 
In this context it is helpful to analyze the prospects for long-term dramatic improvement in 
poverty eradication and global governance. States and territorial communities are not about to 
disappear from world politics. Public spending has risen throughout the 90s in many jurisdictions 
in the global North. Modern welfare states have not buckled as once predicted but they are 
smaller and less potent instruments for redistributive ends. (Lammert, 2004) But as sovereignty 
is rendered increasingly porous, it has become, paradoxically, more important for national 
authority everywhere and citizenship engagement. Access to information flows from both 
mainstream and alternative print and electronic media has created highly visible counter-forums 
worldwide and a yawning digital divide. (World Summit on Information Society, 2000) The 
revolution in information and technology has diffused power away from governments; this has 
empowered social groups and individuals to play a large role in world politics, an arena that used 
to be the exclusive preserve of public authority (Nye, 2002). 
 
We need to drill down and determine the value of these informational flows for the stability and 
vitality of the global economy and national communities. The question is, will states and global 
international institutions learn to view these networked flows and actors as a public good 
essential for a more equitable order? Or, are nation-states on an irreversible collision course with 
global public dissenters, their ‘new rivals and competitors’?  
 
There are two linked parts to the analysis. In part one, we examine the realignment of forces that 
derailed the Cancun meeting to broaden and deepen the WTO’s world trade agenda held in 
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September 2003, which according to conventional wisdom was supposed to be a done deal. The 
growing disjuncture between global cultural flows of people and ideas, and the rules and 
practices of globalization has created a highly unstable environment with many opportunities but 
at the same time significant political costs. Regardless of what EU and US may admit in public, 
at Cancun global dissent and its publics acquired visible agenda-setting power. The growth in 
influence of the ‘nixers’ and ‘fixers’ has contributed to a tectonic shift in the international 
economy that has immediate and far-reaching consequences for destabilizing globalization and 
its narrow economic agenda.  
 
Part two focuses on how global cultural flows of ideas, texts and wealth have deepened the 
global environment of dissent at the WTO. Many of these flows are the consequence of free 
trade itself. They have accelerated as economic barriers have fallen facilitating the movement of 
ideas, people and texts driven by new technologies and the appetite for mass culture. Increased 
trade has increased cultural interaction globally. These concentrated movements of peoples and 
ideas beget other flows triggering a cyclical movement of dissent and are highly disjunctive for 
the goals of economic globalization. When these global cultural flows function as catalysts for 
change, they become both a conduit and channel for the global movement of social forces. They 
set new agendas and, it is this agenda-setting capacity that challenges state authority globally no 
less locally.2  
 
The core argument can be summarized as follows: powerful global cultural flows have added a 
whole new dimension to global dynamics that used to be primarily economic. Culture has 
become an explicitly fierce battleground against US cultural industries and American trade 
policies that are attempting to commodify cultural production and treat it like any other 
commodity on the world market to be bought and sold for profit. Cultural power, and its related 
issues, is the stamp of collective identity.  If democracy is to be fostered argues Yudice, “public 
                                                 
 2 The Robarts Centre currently has a project underway to analyze the complex nature of these global 
cultural flows empirically and to determine their impact on global publics. This paper is the first in a series of pilot 
studies.  In this paper dissent is used generically to refer to normative groups or communities of activists engaged in 
public from across the spectrum on a multitude of issues that challenge and question existing patterns of authority, 
values and ideas.  
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spheres in which deliberation on questions of the public good are to be held must be permeable 
to different cultures.” (Yudice,2003:23)  Framing and creating the relevant mechanisms for 
expressing identity (Zukin, 1995) requires safeguard measures that now do not exist. One of the 
goals of UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity is to protect global cultural 
diversity such as language rights, local cultural production, media ownership and intellectual 
property from prejudicial trade practices and the unequal advancement of new information 
technologies (UNESCO, 2001).  
 
It would be nice if globally shared meanings could succeed in creating a common culture of 
citizenship that would allow the global public to navigate the crisis. So far there is no single 
over-riding vision tha t addresses the collective problem of diversity at the global level. 
Nonetheless, the global dissent movement intends to have a prominent role in defining public 
culture and in shaping it in inherently democratic ways. What it has come to realize is that 
culture is not only about the images, symbols and shared understandings that get people to buy 
branded products, but it is also about the rules and the framework for the ideas and processes of 
exchange on which business thrives.  
 
One of the principal conclusions that the political economy of dissent points to is that people are 
learning to use culture as an economic base and when they do trade negotiations become a highly 
contested sites for the anti-globalization movement and leading countries in the global South. At 
the present time the public’s appetite for more free trade has soured. The world trading system 
acts like a magnet for global dissent of all persuasions. The singular focus on the WTO has 
intensified the cycle of dissent and imposed a degree of cohesion on a highly diverse and 
conflicted movement. As a result the old process of deal making, which produced the WTO’s 
Uruguay Round, is in shambles. In these new circumstances governments ought not to 
underestimate the capacity and resiliency of the global dissent movement to challenge many of 
the core assumptions about the nature of global politics as presently configured.   
 
What is now evident is that no one owns the public and no one can manipulate it for very long, 
although political elites always try to channel and control it. Political elites remain baffled by its 
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power, reach and impact as Bush and Blair have painfully learned. No one can turn the public 
off; it has its own dynamics and properties. Every counterpublic has to give a lot from 
themselves; they have to create the counterpublic as a entity with voice.  
 
What distinguishes the counter public today from that of four decades ago is its organizational 
decentralization and its global reach. Today’s counterpublic is user driven and does not rely on 
face-to-face contact for mobilization. Much of it is maintained without any organization at all, 
and significantly, a great deal of the dissenting, non-conforming public holds to no grand 
narrative for toppling state power. It is not an insurgent public rooted in socialism, marxism or 
social democracy though certainly those elements are present in social movements. The modern 
dissent public does not need gate-keepers of any vanguard party to make it effective. Nor is it 
organized around any incipient belief in the historical mission of the working class to seize 
power in its name or on its behalf. Instead, the primary aim of the modern counterpublic is to 
wage a non-stop information battle for the hearts and minds of the political middle, the sceptics, 
the under 30 youth and the disenfranchised. 
 
Its foot-soldiers are the hundreds of millions of epublic users and global news watchers who 
want to politicize the apathetic and apolitical. So far this strategy of ‘winning the middle’ seems 
to be succeeding despite the helter-skelter ebb and flow of success, meager resources, and the 
marked absence of a revolutionary creed. Their principal accomplishment is not to be 
understated. Counter-publics have driven a deep wedge between elites and public opinion around 
the US war in Iraq, the need for broadening and deepening global free trade, and the neo- liberal 
agenda to shrink the state and cut services. 
 
 
 
The Walkout at Cancun 
 
When a coalition of Southern states led by Brazil, India and South Africa walked out of the trade 
negotiations after the US and EU failed to make concessions on agricultural subsidies, 
investment and the privatization of public services, the WTO faced an unprecedented collapse of 
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trade talks. The enormity of this failure to cut a deal cannot be underestimated for the future of 
the world trading system and the immediate needs of the global South. For the moment it is hard 
to see where the new spirit for co-operation is going to come from, but this has not deterred 
Brazil, India and other countries from pressing ahead with their own much more radical agendas 
for reform of the world trading system with respect to generic drugs, investment rules and 
agricultural subsidies. Re-starting the Doha trade talks will be very difficult given that major 
Southern countries are insisting that the elimination of all export subsidies is a condition for 
negotiations to be successful. (Financial Times, December 16, 2003)  
 
At the root of this insistence lies the fact that while the global South was promised new market 
access in the Uruguay Round, agricultural subsidies in the EU, Japan, Canada and the US have 
become – dare to say the word – permanent. It is quite a revealing exercise to examine the long-
term trend line. Agricultural subsidy levels in the North have not decreased appreciably in 50 
years, having in fact have risen sharply in the 1990s despite some small declines and modest 
reforms. While the Bush Administration promised billions more in subsidies to its farmers, the 
EU and Japan have kept agricultural subsidies off the table.  
 
The World Bank figures show just how extreme and surreal the actual situation is. Today 
average real incomes in the developed world are 75 times higher than in the world’s least 
developed regions. In 2001 the annual dairy subsidy per cow in the EU comes to $913 while its 
annual aid to sub-Saharan Africa kicks in at a shocking $8 per person. The world’s richest 
countries spent $311 billion to subsidize Northern farmers, an amount that dwarfs the $52 billion 
spent on foreign assistance to all developing countries. This is only the tip of the proverbial 
iceberg (Drache and Froese, 2003).  
 
With the large American subsidies it costs US cotton growers about $.87 to grow a pound of 
cotton; while in Africa the same pound of cotton can be produced for approximately $.22. 
Cotton, Africa’s ‘white miracle’ supports about 15 million small farmers and rural people in west 
and central Africa. Cotton yields doubled between 1990 and 1998 but market prices collapsed 
due to the overproduction and large harvests. With earnings from exports plummeting, African 
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producers are desperate. American, Greek and Spanish farmers continue to be subsidized with 
billions of dollars or euros and these subsidies have protected farmers in the global North from 
the vagaries of the global market. In 2002 the subsidy per kilo was higher than the world market 
price per kilo. According to Oxfam, the US is providing “three times as much subsidy to its 
cotton farmers as development aid to 500 million Africans.” (Johnson 2004)  
 
It is no wonder then that agriculture was the deal breaker at Cancun. Neither the EU nor the US 
was ready to help the starving producers of central and western Africa by opening up northern 
markets even as a gesture of good will. The best the US is offering is a deal which does not set 
any deadline for the elimination of agricultural subsidies, but the global South is not buying into 
this latest mini-olive branch. (Financial Times, January 12 2004) They aren’t onside with the US 
or the EU. 
 
Up until Cancun few insiders dissented from the prevailing orthodoxy which held that the WTO 
was a far superior organization to the GATT, which had served the world trading system for 
almost 50 years before it was folded in to the WTO in 1994 (Weiler, 2000). The richest traders 
had forced developing countries to accept a trade agreement that was not in their best interests. 
Increasingly this is the primary explanation for why the WTO is in crisis. 
 
 
Protectionism not an Option   
 
As an institution, the WTO never fully recovered from ‘the battle in Seattle’ despite the fact that 
today more nations belong to the organization than ever before. Even China is a member of the 
club, but this has not made reaching a new consensus any easier. China is at logger-heads with 
the US on a range of trade issues, but particularly over the new quotas Washington imposed in 
2003 on Chinese textiles, apparel and other goods. China’s tariffs have fallen, but US anti-
dumping measures are much more aggressively prevalent. The WTO has had no visible 
dampening effect on Washington’s recourse to pre-emptive trade unilateralism (Prestowitz, 
2003).  
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For instance, US shrimp fisherman are seeking the imposition of stiff tariffs on Thailand, China, 
Vietnam, Ecuador and a handful of other nations. Shrimp imports are up about 20 percent 
compared to the same period in 2003. US shrimpers are aiming to increase prices and reduce 
supply. The strategy in most industries is virtually identical: reduce foreign supply, cut the legs 
under foreign competition and ratchet up domestic prices. (Globe and Mail, December 31 2003) 
The global South can expect to face all kinds of restrictions from non-tariff barriers as well as 
politically motivated anti-dumping measures barring their entry into the US market.  
 
The US will continue to be the primary champion of the WTO’s rules-based system, if for no 
other reason than that the WTO is very much a US creation and its laws and rules benefit US 
multinationals. Aggressive multilateralism has worked in its favour.3 Increasingly the US is 
shifting gears and using a form of coercive bilateralism to whipsaw the world trading system, if 
and when American trade policies are found to violate WTO rules. Washington has signed 
dozens of bi- lateral treaties in the recent period; the advantages of end-running WTO trade law 
are plain (Higgott, 2003).  
 
In a one-on-one negotiation, the US, as the larger and more powerful country, virtually dictates 
the terms and conditions of agreements. It has opened negotiations with many small poor 
countries like the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. To 
increase its leverage with the Bush Administration, the Dominican Republic is sending 300 
soldiers to Iraq in support of the US-led coalition. (Financial Times August 12, 2003) 
The US administration announced in December that it had concluded a deal with these struggling 
Central American countries not only to phase out existing tariffs over the coming decade, thus 
ending the protection of their ‘infant’ industries, but also to deregulate most sectors of their 
                                                 
 3 Canada, along with a group of other countries, brought a case against the US at the WTO that won a 
landmark victory. US producers were found to be in breech of the WTO’s trade rules in being allowed to keep part 
of the anti-dumping illegal duties. Under this arrangement Washington was creating an incentive for industry to 
bring anti-dumping disputes against any country where the US competition was doing poorly. Although the Bryd 
Amendment violates WTO rules, politically Ottawa seems ready to accept a ‘dumb’ compromise that allows the US 
to continue to impose quotas on Canadian softwood exports, keep half of the wrongfully imposed anti-dumping 
duties and restrict Canada’s access to the US market (Globe and Mail, December 9, 2003). As far as Washington is 
concerned WTO trade rules are not an inviolable high standard particularly when they collide with US interests.    
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economies. The crown jewel in the deal is that these countries are required to adopt tough new 
legislation protecting US patents and copyrights. Central American nations have also agreed to 
phase out subsidies to particularly sensitive industries for farm and diary products. While 
Washington describes this concession as unprecedented in US trade agreements, (Financial 
Times, December 18, 2003) the US Council on Foreign Relations warned in a recent report that 
the US policy is myopic and dangerous to the region. (2004) 
 
It is very advantageous for the US to push the bilateral trade agenda as hard as possible now 
because the US has increasingly become a major violator of WTO rules. In terms of its illegal 
imposition of steel anti-dumping duties, an Administration spokesperson stated bluntly in 
November that it would defy the WTO ruling because it went against its own interest. In the end 
the US backed down only because the EU was able to threaten even tougher trade sanctions 
against Washington. Bush announced that the US would comply, but it had required a major 
escalation on the part of the EU to obtain Washington’s compliance with WTO’s legal rules.  
 
 
Aggressive Bi-lateralism and the Bush Administration 
 
The WTO is in a mess because of the aggressive bilateralism of the US and not the knockout 
punch delivered by the leadership of the global South at Cancun. With the WTO so polarized 
internally, it is uncertain it can weather another shock or failure on the scale of Cancun; but no 
one should read this to literally mean that countries are retreating into economic protectionism 
and closing their borders to exports. There is no empirical evidence to indicate that exports are in 
sharp decline because states are not ready to negotiate a new round of global free trade. Despite 
the WTO’s institutional crisis, the world keeps on trading. 
 
Trade remains one of the drivers of all economies, North and South, because average tariff rates 
have fallen to record lows, around 3 percent, for non-agricultural products. Market access is very 
broad and growing despite the breakdown in trade talks. Mexico, Mercosur and even the much 
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troubled Caribbean countries have cut their tariffs and opened their markets to northern industrial 
and agricultural goods.  
 
For instance, NAFTA exports have grown at record rates as have exports between the Mercosur 
partners. A competitive Canadian dollar and a super-competitive Mexican peso are the story in 
NAFTA. Flexible exchange rates in Brazil and Argentina have boosted their exports too. 
Regional trade blocs in the hemisphere are firing on all cylinders. So even in the absence of a 
new post-Uruguay round or a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, trade ties 
within the hemisphere are deepening despite the difficult conditions.  
 
Latin America is not getting its share of foreign investment flows for the equity and bond 
markets, but they do have China banging on the door for raw materials such as copper and iron 
ore as well as soya to feed its rapidly growing population. Rising commodity prices and new 
trade links with Russia, China and India have become very important. Brazil’s trade with China 
has taken off (Financial Times, December 2003). So has Washington’s. US imports from China 
rose 43 percent in 2002-3 compared to a paltry 2.8 percent growth in imports from Mexico. 
NAFTA effects are clearly wearing thin.   
 
The principal difficulty remains that even though regional trading blocs are more export oriented 
than ever global unemployment has hit record highs. Higher global growth failed to create 
enough jobs worldwide. If the goal is to reduce poverty by generating enough jobs to meet the 
UN target of halving poverty by 2015, the world trading system is failing to create sufficient 
amounts of employment to eradicate poverty. Joblessness among young people aged 15-24 
resulted in a poverty rate of almost 15 percent in 2003, two and half times the world wide 
average. (ILO, 2003) Female unemployment is two to three times the regional average. In their 
latest Report, the ILO calls on governments to stop treating poverty as an ‘afterthought’. 
 
It is wrong to think that southern states are in revolt against globalization but, they have become 
smarter and much more discriminating in their response to global integration. They are no longer 
unconditional supporters of the WTO’s idealized, but deformed, view of the market. They have 
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climbed off the world trade express train, at least for the time being, with the basic political 
understanding that to succeed in the global economy much different strategies are needed. At 
Seattle the WTO was paralyzed by street protests and at Cancun the negotiations collapsed when 
an unbridgeable political divide between rich and poor countries broke up the meeting. WTO 
bureaucrats were naïve not to have seen the crisis coming. It is hypocritical and unsustainable for 
rich countries to demand that poor nations liberalize their trade when these powerful groups in 
the global North insist on domestic protection for their own self- interest (Bhagwati, 2004). 
 
 
Global Publics and Heightened Expectations  
 
Millions of citizens worldwide are convinced in a way that even five years ago they were not that 
the idea of a single global order anchored in the WTO’s governance capacity is discredited. 
Global dissent has its own iconography popularized by such worldwide best sellers such as 
Canada’s Naomi Klein’s No Logo and Mark Achbar’s surprise documentary hit The 
Corporation. Michael Moore’s no-holds-barred books and films attacking the American abuse of 
power at home and abroad rounds out this genre. There are dozens of films, books and 
documentaries in other languages feeding the culture of anti-corporate and democratic dissent.  
 
The perception is that globalization as an economic entity is composed of a series of bi- lateral 
trade deals and shifting strategic alliances organized out of Geneva, Washington and Brussels. 
The message of the dissenters, doubters and sceptics is that WTO’s narrow political culture has 
to be radically altered if rising global inequality is to be reversed (Drache and Froese, 2003). The 
driving force behind these normative communities of citizen engagement is that the institutional 
failure of the WTO and other international agencies like it needs to be brought into the open, 
discussed, challenged and addressed by political action (Angus, 2001). The emerging consensus 
feeding the global public’s discontent is that trade liberalization cannot go forward without 
significant and substantial social regulation.   
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International civil society has acquired legs that were scarcely present a decade earlier. It is not 
insignificant that according to the most reliable estimates the NGO global public, an omnibus of 
groups, civic organizations and coalitions numbering in the ten of thousands, mobilized 25 
million worldwide to march in 2003, weeks before the US invaded Iraq. Global protests like this 
one, and many others that are not in the public eye, have taken the dissent movement to new 
levels of intensity. 
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The deepening of dissent can be gauged in other quantitative ways. One measure is that there 
were close to 1,000 NGOs registered at Cancun, a figure slightly smaller than the number of 
official delegates (roughly 1,300). Since the Singapore Ministerial there were only 150 NGOs 
present and the growth since then has been unprecedented. NGOs and the social movements are 
proxy organizations for a variety of highly motivated and determined public interest advocates 
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and defenders. Their capacity for political mobilization as well as their mastery of complex 
policy issues have transformed the ‘nixers’ (most radical) and the ‘fixers’ (more reform-minded) 
into a quasi-permanent but highly effective global opposition (Ostry, 2002).  
 
Today many global NGOs are specialized: Medecins Sans Frontieres – AIDS and public health; 
debt relief –Jubilee Research; Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth– the environment; the 
protection of the Global Information Commons; Save the Children and UNICEF – poverty 
eradication, Oxfam – poverty and trade to name only some of the most prominent. They are 
funded through their own sources and individual contributions as well as through international 
foundations, trade unions, national governments, the EU and UN organizations.(Scholte, 2003) 4  
 
So far global dissent has gained credibility but it is still far from being ‘mainstream’ for a 
particular reason. A vast public is connected in ways that no one could have predicted even a 
decade ago. You may not be ‘the first to know,’ as CNN boasts, but people worldwide are 
informed about trade politics and the global social environment. (Pew International Survey, 
2003) Significantly, the lag effects between the conscious ability to create a new world of 
structures, organizations and stable social forms are smaller than a decade ago but are still 
demonstrably large. One important development is that today news flows from diverse sources 
are organized to broadcast public events and news on a global basis. CNN, El Jazeera, BBC 
World and TV5 reach over the heads of the anti-globalization movement and governments to 
audiences worldwide.  
 
What is remarkable is that this recent upsurge in interest and public attention has not followed 
the predictable path that Anthony Downs wrote about so persuasively, in the early 70s in his 
seminal article on the “Issue Attention Cycle”.(Downs, 1972) Downs explained that with most 
public issues the ‘problem suddenly leaps into prominence”, rivets the public’s attention and then 
fades from view, largely unresolved. Down’s theory predicted that consumers of information get 
                                                 
 4 .It is estimated that the resources for funding education and the organization of NGO activities runs into 
the tens of millions of dollars but anti-globalization resources still remain largely financed from very few institutions 
with deep pockets. The global dissent movement has had to fund-raise from across the social spectrum but the 
funding remains contingent and unstable.  
 15
bored with big issues such as the environment and governance. Today’s global public possesses 
a longer attention span, which has been revealed to be more committed and less fickle than 
Down’s theory suggested. (See Figure 1: Global Cycle of Dissent Post Cancun.) 
 
Although it has taken the better part of a decade to get up and running, it is now almost 
impossible to turn off the global dissenting public’s attention-getting activism because so many 
issues from the environment to the growth in global poverty are linked to the world trade 
organization and its impact on public policy. We haven’t yet thought about the different aspects 
of the global public from a political economy perspective. The recent past underscores the fact 
that there are many connections between cultural flows that make powerful new claims on the 
WTO and the real and symbolic economy – the images, lifestyles and ethnicities –of the political 
economy of dissent. What is the magnitude of these flows and why are they surging? 
Structurally, why are global cultural flows frequent competitors and rivals to global financial 
flows? For now and into the future, what kinds of institutional pressures are driving global 
dissent? Where are we in the dissent cycle? Still on the upswing, entering the long plateau, or 
heading toward the inevitable downturn? 
 
 
The Political Economy of Dissent and the Long Attention Cycle   
Wealth, People and Idea Flows  
 
In the mid-80s, when globalization first caught the attention of many experts, it was possible to 
regard the movement of people and ideas as less determinant and less real than wealth flows, but 
this is certainly no longer the case. Financial flows have rivals. Regional trading blocs have acted 
as an economic magnet at least initially to open borders to the movement of peoples. State policy 
in the industrialized world has been even more important. Since 1970 the number of migrants has 
doubled. Between 1990 and 2000 flows of people grew by 14 percent or 21 million persons. 
Three percent of the world’s population have left their country of origin that means about 175 
million people now reside in a country other than the one they were born (UN International 
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Migrant Report 2002). The magnitude of this flow of people is astounding. (See Figure 2 
Streaming effects of immigrants, media texts and counter publics.) 
 
The global North is the big winner in this systemic movement of peoples with the global South 
the principal sending region; between 1996 and 2000 over 12 million migrants left their country 
of origin for the global North. Between 1990 and 2000 Europe’s migration population grew by 
16 percent (48 million) while North America’s increased by 48 percent (8 million). In Europe net 
migration represented almost 90 percent of population increase on the continent.  
 
 
 
There is no one reason to explain the constant movement of people on the move globally. Skilled 
professionals move to find better opportunities. In fact, experts stress that most migration takes 
place in regional settings (Jan Niessen, 2003). Others leave their country of birth out of 
economic necessity from the least developed regions and nations of the world. Migrant flows 
into the advanced economies have recorded large increases recently. The US and Britain are the 
most dependent on foreign workers. Since 1995 the stock of foreign workers has increased by 51 
percent and 39 percent respectively (OECD Report, 2003). Still others are forced to flee their 
country to escape persecution, war and tyranny.   OECD latest report warns that humanitarian 
migration is becoming more difficult as countries close their borders to political refugees. 
 
Global Cultural Flows 
 
These Are Intense Transnational Movements of People, Media Texts and Ideas That Are 
Disjunctive To Financial Flows and Have Unpredictable Streaming Effects on Cultural 
Diversity. They Give Rise to Agenda-Setting Publics with New Authority Structures That Are 
Highly Normative. Structural Features Include: World News Networks, the Internet, Cellular 
Phones, Satellite Broadcasting, International Reports on the State of the Global Economy and 
Thousands of INGOs Participating in Counter-forms. These Competitors and Rivals to State 
Authority Are Challenging the Practices and Rules of Existing Global Governance 
Institutions.  Global Broadcasting Networks Function as ‘Maps of Meaning’ in Overcoming 
Deep Class, Regional and Linguistic Divides. 
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The process of displacement and resettlement is always disruptive, difficult and change- intensive 
all along the trajectory. Every Western country has policies to recruit highly skilled migrants 
from the global South while denying entry to low-skilled immigrants. North America and Europe 
are able to cherry-pick from among the best educated professionals and workers globally. While 
individual families benefit, there is a global transfer of intellectual and human capital from poor 
to rich countries. The world’s already rich countries are taking human capital and educational 
resources from the less-developed world on an unprecedented scale (Castels, 2003).  
 
In 2002, migrants working in the North sent $88 billion in remittances back home; these 
revenues far exceed the $57 billion that the global South received in development aid. For 
Mexico foreign remittances amount to more than $14 billion annually and represent the single 
most important source of earnings after oil revenues. In 2000 at least nine countries received 
remittances from overseas workers amounting to more than 10 percent of their GDP (UN 
International Migration Report, 2002)..5 More than anything, the streaming effects from the 
global movement of peoples in and out of labour markets are unequal and asymmetrical.  
 
 
                                                 
 5 Key international agreements include: 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees, 1990 UN 
Convention of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families entered into 
force on 1 July 2003; Cairo Programme of Action adopted at the 19th International Conference 
on Population Development. Other structures include the Regional Conference on Migration or 
the Puebla process that address a wide range of issues including human rights of migrant 
children, migration and development. (Jan Niessen, 2003) 
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Figure 2: Streaming effects of immigrants, media texts and counter publics.  Cultural 
interaction is accelerates but exchange remains asymmetrical.
Source: Robarts Centre 2004  
 
 
Cultural flows take many forms that parallel the concentrated movement of peoples. Many  
concern texts, in Stuart Hall’s sense of the term, which denote a cultural object from which 
individual audience members form their own meanings (Stuart Hall, 1996). Films, books, 
television, radio, chat- lines, new broadcasting and internet sites of every description fall in this 
category. These texts create new political narratives in privileged spaces about the state, identity 
and the global economy. In the hands of counter-publics, access to the internet and all kinds of 
new information technologies are part of a larger process of creating new agendas and 
challenging existing ones. The information age has imagined a global order into existence but it 
does not have a set of structures to sustain it. More importantly the new information technologies 
have made possible the organization of many different popular kinds of citizen accessed outlets 
and public forums for counter-publics at the regional no less than the global level.  
 
                                                 
 7 Washington Consensus was the name given by John Williamson to an ensemble of 
market- led policies promoted by economists and trade experts who flew in to Washington to 
advise the IMF, World Bank and the US Department of Treasury in the early 1980s.  
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Some flows are designed by experts who want to build world-wide telecommunication networks. 
Satellite systems, telecommunication grids, local and national telecommunication systems, and 
wireless networks move information and texts world wide. These flows are both local and global 
as national jurisdictions and national sensibility remain formidable barriers to the rapid 
expansion of satellite and other forms of communication. Popular culture has its own identifiable 
flow circuitry that is very complex. These flows are likely to be identity-enhancing and focused 
on the local environment, urban renewal, poverty, music, food, and sports (Canclini, 2001). Even 
highly commercialized in the local language they are recognized as part of the national culture. 
Connected with regional, ethnic and national territory, this kind of intense movement of ideas, 
texts and people seeks to build community and strengthen national sovereignty.  
 
The modern ideal of the public is shaped and affirmed through citizenship engagement which 
builds real and virtual networks generating new knowledge and cultural practices about 
globalization and its potentiality.  Earlier research exaggerated the determining role of 
corporations on consumers and audiences, and overstated the passivity of consumer networks. In 
his influential book on Latinity, Americanness and global consumption, Canclini’s central 
proposition is that consumption has been transformed into “an arena of competing claims” and 
“ways of using it”. Flows of media text and critical ideas help reconstitute a social bond that has 
been sundered by cutbacks and an excessive reliance on individualism.  
 
 
Agenda-Setting Ideas 
 
Media texts have been of great interest for most of the twentieth century as news reports have 
exerted profound influence in shaping global public opinion. The recent consolidation of media 
conglomerates has led to a blurring of news with cultural and informational products.  What the 
global public has been persistently searching for is a way to transform state-centered authority 
and a generalized public interest into a highly effective mechanism for transnational society's 
self-organization. If there is a core idea behind the growth in global dissent, it is that the public 
interest can never be an effective voice without strong institutions and pluralistic publics. Social 
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movements have succeeded in bringing new groups and issues into the public sphere. The 
adversarial conflict which this gives rise to has been essential for the creation of new forms of 
democracy. Global dissent’s strength has been to generalize from individual experience and give 
expression to unfulfilled demands of society. The global public always had a potential for self-
transformation, largely in the space created by the collision between the agenda of the economic 
elites globally and those of popular publics. These movements of people, ideas and texts give the 
global public the means to dialogue with itself (Appaurai, 1996; Rosenau, 1997). 
 
The success of free trade and access to new information technologies has built a global public of 
viewers and the demand for a global market for ideas and news. The global audience watching 
CNN, TV5, BBC World and Al Jazeera is, quite obviously, divided by language, geography and 
politics (See Figure 3 Linguistically Segmented Global Publics). Yet the proliferation of all kinds 
of global reports spreads a way of thinking against global capitalism, with its omnipresent neo-
liberal values, and the deal they are getting from it. The Human Development Report, The Global 
Competitiveness Report, The Arab Development Report, The  Global Information Technology 
Report, Corporate Governance and Capital Flows in a Global Economy, World Investment 
Report, dozens of OECD studies, studies from the World Bank, IMF, UNCTAD, ILO, and Save 
the Children Fund all address quality of life concerns rather than narrow economic management 
issues. As Schumpeter predicted sixty years ago, the market destroys other values that are needed 
for capitalism to thrive. Even a genuinely free market has to fulfill social needs and requires 
large public expenditure and state intervention to ring-circle markets, reduce the reach of 
corporations and address pressing environmental and developmental issues. It has to protect 
society from the market’s harshness and crudity. In the last decade of unprecedented wealth 
creation, markets have surpassed themselves in their pernicious effects and misconceived 
priorities. In Schumpeter’s words, “capitalism creates a critical frame of mind which, after 
having destroyed the moral authority of so many other institutions turns against its own. The 
bourgeois fortress thus becomes politically” indifferent to cope with the attacks on non-market 
institutions. (John Gray and David Willetts, 1997) For precisely the reason he identified 
fundamentalist liberalism has created new possibilities for more social exclusion and inclusion 
simultaneously.   
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Figure 3: Linguistically Segmented Global Publics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constituting the Global Public 
 
The movement of people has refashioned many societies towards diversity and multiculturalism. 
Tourism and travel is a 50 billion dollar annual industry worldwide. Unlike earlier periods of 
mass migration, today many immigrants from South Asia and India are highly-skilled middle 
professionals such as computer programmers, doctors, nurses, engineers and individuals with 
post-graduate degrees. They have a strong sense of ethnic identity, they are well-educated and 
possess many skills which allow them to adapt to their new country and establish themselves 
quickly in the new information economy. These diasporic communities had displayed a readiness 
to think in fresh and innovative ways about a different kind of political world. 
 
At the other end of the scale are hundreds of thousands of unskilled workers looking for new 
employment in the global North. It is estimated that there are four million uncdocumented 
Mexicans working in the US; Canada has as many as 200,000 workers without status; and in the 
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EU millions of workers without papers arrive from Eastern Europe, the Balkans, North Africa 
and Turkey. These communities challenge existing authority structures and constitute a growing 
public for international news broadcasts and multiculturalism (Kotkin, 1993). 
 
As many as 40 million students pursue their studies in foreign countries annually. Most will 
return home after graduating to form the backbone of a more cosmopolitan generation with new 
ideas about the information age and development. Thirty-five million people are stateless or are 
political refugees (World Refugee Survey 2003). As avid consumers of mass culture, hundreds 
of millions watch politics, and sports events. CNN claims that it has a combined audience of over 
1 billion although there is no way to verify this guesstimate. Just as importantly, the growth of 
ethnic newspapers, books and other kinds of printed matter represent conduits that no longer 
operate solely in the interests of commercial efficiency. Appadurai is right in stating that the 
world’s structures, organizations and social forms are malformed to address the ‘floating 
populations and mobile technologies’ of transnational politics within existing national or 
international sovereign frameworks (Appadurai, 2001:5).  
 
Still the sense of shrinking the globe and connecting everyone, as though McLuhan’s global 
village is an in-your-face reality, remains a modern fiction because so much of the global South 
does not have access to clean water let alone a computer (www.itu.int/wsis). Local voices and 
views are not presented given that nearly 70 percent of the world’s web sites are still in English 
(Financial Times, December 11, 2003). It is estimated that as many as 500 million people own or 
have access to a computer and the internet but the internet is still not worldwide. 
 
In the next decade it is expected that the spread of the internet to larger countries in Asia, Latin 
America and Eastern Europe will double again. Forty billion emails are sent and received daily. 
Hundreds of millions of visitors cross borders each year. Hundreds of millions use cell phones to 
connect within and across borders. Thousands of activists attend conference, seminars, and 
workshops in person and on- line. These kinds of information flows, organized to enhance a free 
trade regime, have also created the critical frame of mind which finds that trade is incompatible 
with the institutions and values needed by civil society.  These counter-publics have proven 
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remarkably successful in finding a point of commonality to unite the many different sides of the 
anti-globalization movement. (Angus, 2001) 
 
The word globalization is identified in the popular mind with self- interest rather than the 
protection and advancement of the common good. The case among educated elites is that they 
feel free to thumb their noses at their governments and the putative institutions of global 
government with the IMF and the WTO at the top of their list . As evidenced by the Pew Global 
Survey of International Opinion the recent growth spurt in the size of the middle class in India, 
Mexico, Brazil and South Africa  has had a marked effect on public opinion. Many in its ranks 
now reject the view that free trade is to their advantage (Pew, 2003).  
 
There are powerful reasons for being disillusioned with the deformed ideals of global neo-
liberalism. First it turns out that the nation-state is a much hardier and more resilient creature 
than expected (Cox, 2003). The venerable state and its institutions have not gone the way of the 
plough-horse. Sovereignty is more porous but government spending has risen in many OECD 
countries for health care, education, pensions and social protection. Secondly there is little 
evidence, in many jurisdictions, that the welfare state has been as radically dismantled as it was 
in the US. In the EU alone, three-quarters of its budget is directed towards re-distributive ends. 
And in Canada, despite deep fiscal cutbacks in the mid-1990s, the social policy regime remains, 
by a long stretch, more comprehensive, universal and redistributive than its US. Three of 
Canada’s top social policy analysts conclude that “the distribution of disposable income was 
more equal in 1997 than in 1974". (Hoberg et.al., 2003:269)  
 
It is worth recalling the results of the new International Competitive Index for 2002. The top 
rankings were held by former social democratic countries led by Norway, Finland, Sweden and 
Denmark, all high tax, high wage and highly open economies with extensive social policies and 
redistributive norms. Canada and the US rank 16th and 17th respectively. The index is an 
important reminder that since the US asset bubble burst in the late 90s, the Washington 
Consensus is no longer the high and mighty ideological standard it once was. It appears that it is 
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not only social movements but many states that are in open rebellion against the economic 
strictures of globalization. 
  
   
The Psychological Tipping Point 
 
It is unlikely that we have reached the tipping point or anything approaching it. But at the level 
of psychology the presence of so many multiple identities and loyalties operating at once creates 
formative connectors. They represent an important structural re-connect post-Cancun and have 
tipped the balance of power towards identification with both virtual and real communities and 
networks. ‘Hacktivism’, a term coined by Rob Deibert, captures the way new information 
technologies have created a unique political form of activism that is anti-authoritarian, anti-
corporate, and contests the intellectual property rights as defined by the WTO and US State 
Department interests (Deibert, 2003). Networks spanning continents have created broad-based 
coalitions of civil society actors that are now effectively transnational and global in a way they 
were not a decade ago. They are demanding the expansion of the public sphere for debate and 
action and they want to make the issue of globalization and democracy front and centre of public 
discussion. 
 
These kinds of informational news flows have a unique ability to establish people in 
relationships with other flows. They are never value-free or aimless and in the minds of the 
global public they involve a lot of borrowing and mixing of cultures and identity. Particularly for 
those who migrate, the disconnect in the journey to a new society and culture is huge. It involves 
displacement, resettlement and a new citizenship with inclusion or exclusion the end of the 
journey (Papastergiadis, 2000). Migration is never a singular experience for society; it is more 
often like a tidal wave where displacement and a complex cultural exchange operate together. 
Much has been written about the hybridity of cultural flows that the physical presence of 
strangers coming to a new country triggers.  
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But what is more significant today is that this cultural mixing and churning eventually occurs 
without the movement of people. Face to face contact is not required; proximity is no longer 
essential. This is precisely the way our national identities were transformed by print capitalism, 
which replaced face-to-face contact with the idea of the ‘imagined’ national communities 
(Anderson, 1995). In this computer age, the bumping and jostling has created lots of new 
circuitry within countries but, equally importantly, what Keane and others call transnational civil 
society – society beyond borders (Keane, 2003). The term includes both economic and cultural 
activities as well as political engagements that are organized by individuals and groups 
voluntarily outside of the direct control of the state (Held, 1996, p.57). As much as these new 
relationships are rooted in active localisms, there is also something quite distinct and innovative 
in the way these processes occur. 
 
So far the global public has seen its support grow and its influence expand. Without question we 
have not yet properly examined how this constant inter- individual communication in real time 
has very big consequences for the global public itself and states everywhere. Augé calls this 
phenomenon the paradox of instanteity that puts “every person into relation with the entire 
world” (1999:95). It is this pivotal idea of “being in relationship with” the larger structures of the 
global social order that is one of the essential ingredients of collective identification and has 
contributed to the growth of global dissent and its particular dynamics. 
 
 
The Novelty of Political Dissent 
 
Today, the emergent counter-publics, much in evidence at Cancun and other forums, no longer 
have quite the same knee-jerk reactive response to the unequal conditions of power imposed by 
economic neo- liberalism. It is now almost conventional wisdom that free markets are pernicious 
and destructive to other important values. Emergent publics have learned to make effective use 
of their right to communicate and associate in ways no longer premised on exclusive 
membership in one national community. Stuart Hall's distinction between different strategies of 
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action is relevant here: the active public can submit to the new power structures; take an 
oppositional stance; or creatively innovate. (Hall, 1996) 
 
Two decades ago global public dissent was in its infancy and at the margins of global 
governance. Today, the global public’s loyalties are divided between being the ‘nixing’ and 
‘fixing’ camps. These counter-publics function as a kind of 'democratic dam' (Hall quoted in 
Habermas, p.444) against the encroachment of the private use of public interest. While 
transnational dissent may never get its hands on the levers of power, the global activist public 
has been forced to make alliances and build powerful temporary coalitions along the way. Global 
dissent is anchored in a deep critique of the way social power is exercised, distributed and 
acquired (Scholte, 2003). The election of Lula (Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva) to the presidency in 
Brazil and of Nestor Kirchner in Argentina has created a world social forum of leaders who 
speak out against, what Friedman has depicted as the golden straight-jacket of neo- liberalism. 
(Friedman, 2000)  
 
The issue that we need to think about a great deal is how and why the global information age has 
transformed once docile consumers of news and information into an agitated, highly opinionated 
citizenry.  There is an appetite for a culture of dissent based on more public participation, more 
education, more debate and, above all else, more public accountability in international 
organization (Scholte, 2003). In a world dominated by new information technologies and 
complex global financial flows, dynamic and complex global cultural movements of people, 
texts and ideas exhibit an impressive array of agenda-setting powers. What kind of future lies in 
store for the global dissent movement?  
 
 
People Powe r and Global Dissent 
 
Mass mobilization and the influence of the global public is stronger than it was a decade ago 
because the interstate system has been transformed by, what Rosenau correctly termed, the 
multiple and diverse sources of “people power” (Rosenau, 1992: 257). At the same time, 
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governments are less competent to address the major issues facing their societies. Traditional 
exercise of authority is being contested up and down the line, and in this bifurcated global 
system, transnational organization has lost the authority and legitimacy it once enjoyed.  
 
We are in an age of the ‘smart citizen’ where the location and exercise of authority is being 
changed by the way policies and activism is understood. The global public feels itself 
empowered to “interfere” in the way policies are framed and implemented. Still, many 
governments are clinging to the remnants of the Washington Consensus even though these 
discredited policies are a key factor contributing to the growth of global dissent.7 It has not 
escaped the attention of the global public that one of the most sacred pillars of global supply-side 
economics was that countries cannot run deficits. EU countries were to face stiff fines and 
sanctions from financial markets if they did.  
 
In a way that was unimaginable a scarce five years ago both France and Germany are in violation 
of the EU Stability Pact and if the EU was stricter in the way it keeps its accounts, it would have 
to include Portugal and Greece in the default column as well. In November 2003, the EU voted 
against sanctions and did not enforce disciplinary action on Berlin and Paris for their failure to 
conform to the Eurozone’s fiscal framework. (Financial Times, December 15, 2003. Instead it 
accepted promises from Paris and Bonn to voluntarily do better. ‘More flexibility’ are the code 
words for moving away from the strict letter of the old consensus which interdicted members 
from running a deficit of more than 3 percent of GDP particularly at times of high 
unemployment and low growth. In fact it now appears that France will not meet European’s 
Union’s stability pact through to 2007. If this happens, France will have broken EU rules for six 
successive years running, but with the need to spend more on health care and employment 
benefits there is little chance that it will comply with the pact. (Financial Times, January 27, 
2004). 
 
In the US, Bush has abandoned, for the foreseeable future, the principle of a zero deficit target. 
The massive $300 billion defence budget and implementation of deep tax cuts have buried key 
elements of the Washington Consensus in a way the anti-globalization movement could never 
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have predicted. The US deficit is at 4.2 percent of GDP for 2004 and well on its way to being 
closer to 5% by 2006-7. Plans to cut taxes, to spend more on health care reform and greater 
defence spending will make it next to impossible for Bush to cut the budget deficit. (Financial 
Times, January 28, 2004)  
 
It is evident that many academics mistakenly treated the zero-deficit/zero- inflation targets as 
holy scripture; but the Washington Consensus was never the ten commandments of public policy 
(Naim, 2002; Underhill, 2001).8 In many jurisdictions, state sovereignty visibly declined and 
governments had little appetite or interest in promoting social justice (Arthurs, 2001). But in 
practice, the one-world template was applied in dramatically different ways across national 
jurisdictions, by the local elites in their own self interest, as such it is hard to discern any 
singularity of application or outcome from this highly generalized ideology.  
 
Take the examples of Germany, France, Italy and the Scandinavian group of countries. Against 
all predictions to the contrary, these once social democratic countries remained high spenders on 
public goods, high tax regimes and high wage economies when compared to the US and Britain. 
Even Canada and the US did not interpret the Washington Consensus principles with one mind. 
While the Bank of Canada set an inflation target of zero in the early 90s, the US Federal Reserve 
set its at three percent. Canada had twice the level of unemployment as the US rate which was 
under 4 percent (Boyer and Drache, 1996). 
 
Some countries did much better rejecting the Washington Consensus rules. Both India and China 
ran deficits, used subsidies and tariffs to strengthen their export performance, gradually 
liberalized their highly regulated economies, battled inflation as well as increased exports. Their 
non-Washington Consensus mix of policies achieved impressive growth rates! These once 
mighty ‘silver bullets’ have proven to be duds. Countries have found they need better ammo and 
a much larger public arsenal to be effective players in the global economy.  
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There are ways to acquire this leverage and for some countries going outside the rules-bound 
WTO legal culture is the most effective measure. In the critical area of public health, the price of 
medicine has to fall for cancer, heart and diabetes treatment in the global South but with trade 
talks stalled indefinitely the multinational pharmaceutical giants are not going lower drug prices 
voluntarily. (Financial Times, December 11, 2003) Still South Africa has just concluded a 
licensing agreement with multi-national drug companies that grants voluntary licences to local 
generic drug manufacturers. This is a big break through and will lead other countries to negotiate 
similar arrangements for cheap Aids drugs. Similarly, Brazil is not waiting till an agreement is 
reached on new investment rules. Instead it is fast tracking legislation to develop private public 
partnerships to rebuild its run down infrastructure including roads, railways and ports. It is using 
the same kind of legislation modelled after Germany’s and Portugal’s experience in using private 
funds to finance large scale public projects. (Financial Times, January 23, 2004)    
 
Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and a score of other countries want to stabilize their economies and 
protect them from external shocks triggered by run-away- inflation. For the newly elected 
governments in Argentina and Brazil, job-creation and poverty eradication remain the top 
priorities. (Financial Times December 11, 2003). 9 Fiscal discipline is an important part of any 
recovery but it is inadequate as a single template for public policy. Argentina is determined to 
write off as much as 75 percent of its debt. The Argentina Bondholders’ Committee, a New York 
based group representing about $7 billion in defaulted loans, has recently proposed a 35 percent 
write-off. In a recent speech Kirchner pledged “to wage battle against private creditors.” 
(Financial Times, January 24, 2004) In his opening remarks to the Summit of the Americas in 
Monterrey Mexico Paul Martin, Canada’s new Prime Minister, summed up ‘the new normal’ in 
these words: “Fiscal discipline is important but has to be balanced by social policy.”(DFAIT, 
                                                                                                                                                             
 8 Robert Bartley, long-time editor of the Wall Street Journal and champion of supply-side economics, 
coined the phrase “free men; free markets” but Thatcher’s formulation, ‘there is no alternative’ (TINA) remains the 
signature words of free market economics. 
 9 Brazil’s Lula and Argentina’s Kirchner belong to a generation in South America which was persecuted by 
military authorities; they strongly oppose the use of force. Since the collapse of the Argentinean economy in 
December 2001, Kirchner’s government has been giving 2 million households relief in order to survive. Cutting 
safety nets, a singular priority of the Washington Consensus, is not part of their current agenda but tough austerity 
measures remain in place. 
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January 13, 2004)  A strategy of salvage and retrieval to the ruinous liberal political and 
economic models that have dominated public policy for the last two decades requires a much 
broader and fuller response to eradicate poverty, alleviate hunger and build sustainable 
development.10 The question is, does the global dissent movement have the intellectual resources 
and political will to cope with the dilemmas created by the wreckage of neo- liberal ideology?  
  
 
A Turning Point? A World Polity Without Elections  
 
Because it is not a mass political party, the policies, programs and practices of the global public 
cannot be standardized, packaged, or sold to an eager or sceptical electorate. A global public 
sphere that is only for the privileged and the powerful and excludes the critical publics is always 
highly vulnerable to challenges from below. The potential to extend democracy through reform 
and debate has gained a global political constituency. In a global world of networks and 
information, the supreme irony is that no one gets to vote for or against more global free trade or 
for getting the Doha world trade round on track. It is significant that global governance issues 
never achieve finality, because without finality global dissent is able to occupy a unique, highly 
fluid space in the political annals of modern theory.  
 
Without a mainstream champion, the anti-globalization movement has had to look inward rather 
than outward for staying power and influence. This is why Appadurai’s idea that disjunctive 
flows “generate acute problems of well-being and encourages an emancipatory politics of 
globalization” is so powerful (Appadurai, 2001: 6). People are being forced to resist state 
violence and seek social redress where ever they find themselves. Dedicated information flows 
and the movement of peoples create new expectations and vistas that are, by definition, 
increasingly transnational. Bypassing unilateral state sovereignty is one of the main drivers 
reconfiguring state-citizen relations. The smart citizen no longer believes as an article of faith 
                                                 
  
 10 Meeting between President Jacques Chirac, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President Ricardo Lagos 
and United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
Geneva, January 30, 2004, Joint Declaration, Action against hunger and poverty. 
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that matters internal to their country are solely to be determined by their state. This mind/value 
shift has destabilized existing political hierarchies and opened a range of emergent 
possibilities.(Sassen 2002) 
 
Protection of global cultural diversity for people everywhere may well become the next front for 
the global dissent movement.  Cultural policy fits uneasily with the WTO’s commodify-all-
goods approach in the Doha Round. UNESCO’s Declaration on Cultural Diversity adopted in 
November 2001 raises the stakes and gives new energy to the need for a global cultural agenda 
(UNESCO, 2001). Developing strategies to strengthen cultural policies and create an 
environment that values diversity has been at the margins of the global dissent publics’ agenda. 
Issues such as media ownership, language rights, access to the internet, import quotas and the 
need to protect local cultures from predatory trade liberalization and rapid technological changes 
require governments and civil society to provide new opportunities for promoting cultural 
diversity in the face of globalization.  
 
UNESCO’s action plan requires shrinking the WTO’s reach, building digital literacy, promoting 
linguistic diversity and protecting endogenous cultural practices, texts, ideas and products. 
Articles 18 and 19 require public authority to develop proactive cultural policies and broaden and 
deepen the role of civil society as a democratic force. Article  14 calls for governments to protect 
the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples and build “synergy between modern science and 
local knowledge.” Sustaining diversity is one of the building blocks to curb the narrow self-
interests now ascendant. Articles 7, 8, 9 of the action plan call on states to assert themselves at 
the local and global level in the area of cultural policy.  
 
So far there is no single over-riding vision that addresses the collective problem of diversity at 
the global level. Nonetheless, the global dissent movement has a prominent role in defining 
public culture and in shaping it in inherently democratic ways. It has created a group identity for 
citizens and brought many issues into the public sphere. At a more fundamental level the 
discursive reality of global free trade has hardly begun to confront cultural strategies for 
economic redevelopment.   
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In an age of deep global cultural flows, co-ordinated global action is needed to safeguard the free 
flow of ideas, text and people from the homogenizing effects of globalization. 11 The UNESCO 
instrument on Cultural Diversity is a powerful rival to the goals and objectives of the world 
trading system. It focuses on the mechanisms for an inclusive public culture and for the 
safeguarding of cultural, ethnic and linguistic diversity. With so many groups claiming the use of 
the global public, the very notion of a global public culture appears to be modern and 
progressive. Effective development of the ideas and institutional framework of public culture 
requires redirecting global interconnectedness so that it is valued as a public good. Today’s smart 
citizen has many more skills to adapt to the dynamism and dislocation of change.   
 
There are many dangers looming ahead. Fears about immigrants and migration flows are already 
leading to more clampdowns on would-be workers. In Europe and in Washington new legislation 
makes crossing borders much tougher for political refugees and the least skilled. (Drache, 2004) 
Many EU countries are imposing quotas and other restrictions. Even if Western Europeans are 
more tolerant than Eastern Europeans of immigrants from Africa and Asia, the potential for a 
political backlash is not to be underestimated. Welfare benefits could be a flashpoint.  This has 
already occurred in the US where Washington has denied immigrants the same benefits as US 
citizens receive. The European Commission requires that member states cannot discriminate 
between foreigners and citizens but the EU’s equality principle now embedded in its constitution 
could be in jeopardy from future developments. (Financial Times, Feburary 9, 2004) 
 
A much bigger issue is that in an interdependent age the global public is disciplined by states, 
markets and powerful private corporate interests. The inherent lag time between the emergence 
of new organizational forms and practices is very large. Personal burnout and the fallout from the 
long cycle of dissent dampen expectations and demoralizes many. Normative collectivities of 
diverse public activists are not fully fledged political communities. They quickly self-organize 
but, also, just as rapidly fade from sight. Non- institutionalized dissent remains vulnerable to US 
Homeland Security. The Bush Administration will continue to try to discredit its influence and 
                                                 
 11 In 1998 Canada’s Heritage M inister invited cultural Ministers from around the world to attend an 
international meeting on cultural policy in Ottawa. The meeting established the International Network on Cultural 
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authority. But the very aggressive information management strategies employed by global elites 
have failed to dampen the agenda-setting ability of global dissent. So far global publics have 
been very successful in positioning themselves in the most highly visible parts of the national 
and international economy.( World Social Forum, 2004) 
 
The current imbalance between public and private has many parallels with the inter-war system 
of laissez-faire free trade, the direct antecedent of our modern experiment with free trade. The 
earlier universal system collapsed in the 30s because it failed to generate a new broad policy 
framework that weighted public good ahead of private interests. The question is, are we reaching 
a similar fork- in-the road where the global trading system is again dangerously out of touch with 
the needs of the globe to protect the social bond and eradicate poverty?   
 
The very idea of having a development round was a major shift in direction for the WTO.12 
Trade insiders had long insisted that the WTO was first and foremost a trade organization and to 
have a so-called ‘development round’ exploded one of its founding myths that trade was only 
about market access, a level playing field and international competitiveness (Barfield, 2002).  
All but the most orthodox of trade-hardliners now acknowledge that, after a decade of detailed 
and compelling research on poverty eradication by some of the world’s leading economists, the 
unregulated growth of exports and capital flows had visible and disastrous effects on the 
environment, the most vulnerable, rural women and the household whether intended or not 
(Rodrik, 2002; Drache and Froese, 2003).  
 
 
When Mistrust is Endemic: By Way of a Conclusion 
 
When seen in the larger perspective the failure at Cancun is part a much larger crisis of 
legitimacy that is currently paralyzing the WTO. End-running the WTO’s legal culture has 
become more flagrant and frequent. The EU and the US are repeat offenders relying heavily on a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Policy, an influential elite lobby group to support and work in parallel with UNESCO. (INCP, 2004) 
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range of instruments from tax policy to export credits for their largest and most competitive 
firms. Boeing and Airbus are two cases in points.  Each has received billions in dollars from their 
respective governments. Bombardier, the Canadian manufacturer of mid-range airplanes and 
Embraer, its Brazilian counterpart, have also received billions in subsidies from their respective 
government (Robarts Centre, 2001). The US auto industry has received over $5 billion in state 
aids of all kinds to attract new investment from Japanese and German auto giants as well as the 
US Big Three Auto Industry.  
 
It is straining credulity to believe that countries, no less than industries, can become global 
competitors without massive public support for development, research, higher labour standards, 
skills-training and cheap credit to finance export sales. India, China, Brazil and Mexico now 
understand in a way they previously had not that global competition requires public authority to 
play a large, on-going, and critical role in any eventual success story.  
 
To sum up. The argument presented is that mistrust of the WTO’s rules is widespread and 
endemic; no one should expect any quick reform of its legal culture and practices. Regional trade 
agreements are stalled as the global South is not prepared to give everything for market access 
for its merchandise. No northern government has shown a willingness to compromise and reduce 
tariffs on farm products. (Financial Times, February 10, 2004) Politics has become a contest 
over credibility and credulity, and the basic condition of world wide interdependence has opened 
up a large and highly influential role for global dissent as states everywhere face tough 
competition from their global publics. The ‘democratic dam’ is holding, at least for the present, 
and global dissent is in overdrive. The re-emergence of counterpublics as a third force globally 
needs to be further studied, monitored and analyzed.  
 
 The primary conclusion of this paper is that the lack of accountability and transparency in global 
governance now feeds a cycle of dissent. Knowledge and knowledge-based communities 
empower these diverse counterpublics as advocacy networks and new information technologies 
                                                                                                                                                             
 12 The failure of the UN-sponsored Development Decade, in the early 60s, to eradicate global poverty is an 
earlier antecedent. See Sneyd, (2003).  
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become key instruments in organizing across national boundaries. In this context when we speak 
of the public as a noun with a capital ‘P’ it means those actions, policies and beliefs that are 
“open and available to, used or shared by all members of the community” for the promotion of 
the general welfare.” The defining quality of counterpublics is that they cheer and fight for the 
integrity of their community. Counterpublics give a lot of themselves because they have to 
establish their credentials as a significant force in domestic and global politics. 
 
We are still in the early stages of the global dissent movement, and the peak of the cycle is not 
yet in sight. The tough but essential questions that demand more convincing answers are: How 
can the forces of globalization be harnessed for public good? What is the vision behind global 
dissent? What is being asked for instead? In the end the political economy of dissent cannot 
escape the core issues: agency, political will and capacity.  Normative questions require 
normative solutions; strong and vigilant publics are demanding comprehensive action to 
eradicate inequality and protect social and cultural difference. Compared to a decade ago, the 
previous psychic dichotomies that, once pitted the local against the global, are less relevant than 
ever. Tant mieux. 
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